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I. Introduction
As costs of post-secondaryeducationhave risen and fundinghas decreased,
institutionsof highereducationhavecometo relyon educationalloansto maintaintheir
enrollmentlevelsandprograms.1 Indeed,theseinstitutionshavebecomedependentupon
federallyfinancededucationalloanprogramsfortheireconomicwellbeing.2Althoughthe
guaranteedloansaremadebyprivatelenders,thefederalgovernmentassumesliabilityif a
studentborrowerdies,defaults,or seeksbankruptcyrelief.3 Becausethefederalgovernment
guaranteesrepaymentof theseloans,theirdischargeabilityinbankruptcyproceedingsaffects
all taxpayers.Thispaperoffersanhistoricaloverviewof thesocialmilieugivingrisetothe
generalnondischargeabilityof educationalloansin bankruptcyproceedings,etsforthabrief
legislativehistoryof thesectioncontainingthegeneralnondischargeabilityprovision,and
providesananalysisof SixthCircuitCourtof Appealsprecedentinterpretingthegeneral
nondischargeabilityprovision.4
II. Overview
A. BankruI!!£y Laws
TheUnitedStatesConstitutionvestsCongresswiththeauthority"[t]oestablish.. .
uniformLaws on thesubjectof BankruptciesthroughouttheUnitedStates."s In 1898,
Congressexercisedthis authorityby enactingthe BankruptcyAct. Althoughsuffering
severalsubstantialmendmentstotheoriginalenactment,thepurposeof theBankruptcyAct
was and remainsto "give[] to the honestbut unfortunatedebtorwho surrendersfor
distributionthepropertywhichheownsatthetimeof bankruptcy,a newopportunityin life
anda clearfield for futureeffort,unhamperedbythepressureanddiscouragementof pre-
existingdebt.,,6TheBankruptcyAct in itspresentformiscodifiedasII USC §I0I, etseq.
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B. GuaranteedEducationalLoanPrograms
During the twentiethcentury,a plexus of congressionalenactmentsand
administrativer gulationscreatedseveraleducationalincentiveprogramswherebystudents
seekingto pursuepost-secondaryeducationcouldavail themselvesof publicandprivate
fundstoachievethoseends.Theseprogramshavebeenadministeredin a varietyof forms,
includingbutnotlimitedto:
. FederalWorkStudyandinstitutional(non-subsidized)workstudyprograms
Pell GrantsandSupplementalGrants('SEOGs"),whichareawardedto low-
incomeundergraduatestudentsbasedon theirincomeand/orthe incomeof
theirparents
Low-interestloansfor studentsavailablethroughtheFederalDirectStudent
Loan ("FDL") ProgramandtheFederalFamilyEducationLoan ("FFEL")
Program
StaffordLoans and low-interestPerkinsloans,availableto studentswith
exceptionalfinancialneedundertheFederalPerkinsLoanProgram
Parent("PLUS") Loans,availablethroughtheFDL andFFEL programs
Financialaid for healthcarestudents,suchas HealthEducationAssistance
Loans("HEAL") andNationalHealthServiceCorps("NHSC")7
TheIynchpinof theseprivateloanprogramsconsistsof a guaranteearrangementby
whichprivatelendersextendloanstostudentsforpost-secondaryeducationpurposes,witha
guaranteefrom the federalgovernmentthatsuchloanswill be repaidin theeventof a
borrower'sdeath,default,or insolvency.Thefederalgovernmentpaysaccruingintereston
subsidizedloanswhilethestudent-debtorattendscollegeor graduateschool;however,the
debtorpaysinterestonunsubsidizedloanswhichaccrueswhilethedebtorattendschool.8
III. Historvof BankruptcyLawsvis-a-visEducationLoan Proerams
TheBankruptcyAct didnotatfirstconcernitselfwiththedischargeabilityof student
loans. In 1970,however,CongressformedtheCommissionon theBankruptcyLaws(the
"1970Commission"),consistingof a panelof juristsandscholarsto reformthebankruptcy
laws.9At thattime,storiesinthemediarecountedhowindividualsoughtbankruptcyrelief
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to dischargestudentloans despitetheir prospectsfor substantialfuture income.lo
"Concernedthattheperceptionof abuse,howeversmall in reality,would"discredithe
systemandcausedisrespectfor thelawandthosechargedwith its administration,"II the
1970CommissionpresentedamodelbankruptcycodetoCongressin 1973,whichcontained
a sectionbarringstudentloansfromdischargexceptin casesthatwouldresultin undue
hardship.I2The 1970Commissionexpresslyacknowledgedthatveryfewstudentloanswere
dischargedin bankruptcy,citinganOfficeof Educationstudythathadconcludedthatthe
bankruptcyratein theguaranteedstudentloanprogramwas lessthanone-quarterof one-
percentof all payableloans.13While recognizingthat"studentloan abusewas more
perceptionthanreality,"14the 1970Commission everthelessbelievedthatthefewcases
whichinvolvedabusivestudentloandebtorsposedathreatothecontinuationof thestudent
loanprogramby blemishingits image.IS Realizingthata drasticoverhaulmightprovetoo
burdensomefordebtorsinserioustrouble,the1970Commissionrecommendedanexception
to across-the-boardnondischargeability:If thedebtorcould showthatthestudentloans
causedunduehardshipforthedebtorandhisdependents,thoseloanscouldbedischarged.16
Despitethe 1970Commission'sposition,studentloansremainedpresumptively
dischargeableuntil 197617whenCongressbecameconcernedwitha perceivedhighdefault
rateonguaranteedstudentloans.Althougha 1976GeneralAccountingOfficestudyreported
thatlessthanone-percentof all maturededucationalloansweredischargedin bankruptcy,
articlesappearedin thepresswhichcreatedtheimpressionthatstudentshabituallyreceived
dischargesof their loans.I8 Thus, in the 1976EducationAct Amendments,19Congress
provided:
A debtwhichis a loaninsuredorguaranteedundertheauthorityof thispart
maybereleasedbya dischargeinbankruptcyundertheBankruptcyAct only
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if suchdischargeis grantedafterthe five-yearperiod(exclusiveof any
applicablesuspensionof the repaymentperiod)beginningon the dateof
commencementof therepaymentperiodof suchloan,excepthatpriortothe
expirationof thatfive-yearperiod,suchloanmaybereleasedonlyif thecourt
in whichthe proceedingis pendingdeterminesthatpaymentfrom future
incomeorotherwealthwill notimposeanunduehardshiponthedebtororhis
dependents.
See,20USC 1087-3(1976).
Althoughtheempiricalevidencehadindicatedthattheamountof moneylostdueto
studentbankruptcyfilingsrepresentedaverysmallpercentageof thetotaloutstandingloans,
Congresscitedtheperceivedgrowingtrendtowardincreasedstudentloanbankruptcyfilings
asthereasonforthe1976EducationActAmendments.2o
After theenactmentof the 1976EducationAct Amendments,toriesin themedia
continuedtotellof studentsdischargingsubstantialstudentloandebtin bankruptcywhileon
thebrinkof lucrativeprofessionalcareers.Thus,in 1978Congressactedonceagainand
codifiedthe 1970Commission'suggestionfor a nondischargeabilityprovisionas section
523(a)(8)of the 1978BankruptcyReformAct.2I As originallyenactedon November6,
1978,section523(a)(8)read:
(a)A discharge. . doesnotdischargeanindividualdebtorfromanydebt-
* * * *
(8) for an educationaloan made,insured,or guaranteedby a
governmentalunit,or madeunderanyprogramfundedin wholeor in
part by a governmentalunit or a non-profitinstitutionof higher
education,unless-
(A) suchloanfirstbecameduebeforefiveyears(exclusiveof
anyapplicablesuspensionof therepaymentperiod)beforethe
dateof thefilingofthepetition;or
(B) exceptingsuchdebtfromdischargeunderthisparagraph
will imposeanunduehardshipon thedebtorandthedebtor's
dependents(.]
11USC §523(a)(8)(1975).22
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Section523(a)(8)representeda compromisebetweentheHousebill andtheSenate
amendmentregardingeducationalloans.Namely,it providedbroaderprotectiontocreditors
underthen-existinglaw,whichwaslimitedto federallyinsuredloans,butappliedonlyto
educationaloansowing to a governmentalunit or a nonprofitinstitutionof higher
education.23By theplainlanguageof thisstatute,a debtorcoulddischargestudentloans
evenabsentunduehardshipif theloanshadbecomedueat leastfiveyearsbeforefilingfor
bankruptcyrelief. However,as furtherprovidedby section523(a)(8),thefive-yearperiod
wastolledif thedebtorequestedadeferralof repayment.24
In 1990,Pub L 101-647,§3621(1)amendedsection523(a)(8)to increasethefive
yearnondischargeabilityperiodtosevenyears:
(a)A dischargeundersection727,1141,1228(a),1228(b),or 1328(b)of this
titledoesnotdischargeanindividualdebtorfromanydebt-
* * * *
(8) for aneducationalbenefitoverpaymentor loanmade,insuredor
guaranteedby a governmentalunit, or madeunderany program
fundedin whole or in part by a governmentalunit or nonprofit
institution,or for an obligationto repay funds receivedas an
educationalbenefit,scholarshiporstipend,unless-
(A) suchloan,benefit,scholarship,or stipendoverpayment
firstbecameduemorethan7years(exclusiveof anyapplicable
suspensionof the repaymentperiod)beforethedateof the
filingof thepetition;or
(B) exceptingsuchdebtfromdischargeunderthisparagraph
will imposeanunduehardshiponthedebtorandthedebtor's
dependents[.]
II use § 523(a)(8)(I990).25
Pursuanto theplainlanguageof thestatute,a debtorcouldnowdischargestudent
loansabsentunduehardshipif theloanshadbecomedueatleastsevenyearsbeforefilingfor
bankruptcyrelief. As before,theseven-yearperiodwastolledif thedebtorrequesteda
deferralof repayment.26
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Four years later,the BankruptcyReformAct of 199427createdthe National
BankruptcyReview Commission(the "1994 Commission")and chargedit with the
responsibilityto preparea reporton issuesin theBankruptcyCodefor submissionto the
President,Congress,andtheChief Justice. On October20, 1997,the1994Commission
submitteditsfinalreport,whichacknowledgedthat"empiricalevidencedoesnotsupporthe
oft-cited allegationthat changesin bankruptcylaw entitlements-- exemptions,
dischargeability,or otherwise-- affectthe rateof filing for bankruptcyto obtainthose
benefits.,,28Thereportfurtherpointedoutthattheunduehardshipexception"is narrowly
construedsuchthatthedebtorsmostin needareleastlikelyto beableto litigatetheissue
convincinglyor at all.,,29 Citing ArthurRyman,ContractObligation:A Discussionof
Morality,Bankruptcy,andStudentDebt30andMargaretHoward,A Theoryof Dischargein
ConsumerBankruQ.!fy,31the 1994Commissionacknowledgedthe irony that"Congress
placedguaranteedloansinaclasswithdebtsfortaxes,debtsinducedbyfraud,anddebtsfor
compensationof injuriesby drunkdrivers,'d2suchthatCongress'enactmentof section
523(a)(8)treatedguaranteededucationalloans"asmoreobligatorythanotherloans,defining
them to be as compellingas debtsarising from turpitude.,,33The reportfurther
acknowledgedthat the guaranteededucationaloan systemhad been "exploitedby
proprietaryschools,colleges,anduniversities,as well as by bankersandotherlenders,
throughcontractsof adhesionthatmoststudentsmustacceptlesttheygiveuptheideaof
learning.,,34Thus,thereportconcludedthatsection523(a)(8)shouldberepealedbecause
"[t]hebankruptcysystem,throughitsnetworkof exceptionstodischarge,seemsto penalize
individualswhoseektoeducateandimprovethemselveswhileit liberatesotherindividuals
fromoverwhelmingdebtincurredfor otherpurposesor throughdifferentmeans.,,35The
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1994Commissionbelievedthatrepealingsection523(a)(8)wouldputanendto litigation
overtheunduehardshipexception"sothatthedischargeof studentloansnolongerwouldbe
deniedtothosewhoneeditmost.,,36
Notwithstandingthe 1994Commission'srecommendationthatsection523(a)(8)be
repealed,onOctober7, 1998,section523(a)(8)(A)wasamendedtoeliminatetheseven-year
dischargeabilityprovisionandtoestablishstudentloansasgenerallynondischargeableinthe
absenceof unduehardship.37 Section523(a)(8)hasnot beenamendedsincethe 1998
repealer,andin itscurrentformreads:
A dischargeundersection727,1141,1228(a),1228(b),or 1328(b)of thistitle
doesnotdischargeanindividualdebtorfromanydebt-
* * * *
(8) for an educationalbenefitoverpaymentor loanmade,insuredor
guaranteedby a governmentalunit, or madeunderany program
fundedin whole or in part by a governmentalunit or nonprofit
institution,or for an obligationto repay funds receivedas an
educationalbenefit,scholarshiporstipend,unlessexceptingsuchdebt
fromdischargeunderthisparagraphwill imposeanunduehardshipon
thedebtorandthedebtor'sdependents
II USC §523(a)(8)(2005).
Threeissueshavepredominatedthelitigationinvolvingsection523(a)(8),namely:
Whatis aneducationalbenefit,whatinstitutionsarecovered,andwhatconstitutesundue
hardship.Thispaperfocusesonthelatterissue,namely,whatconstitutesunduehardshipfor
purposesofdischarginganeducationalloanundersection523(a)(8)of theBankruptcyCode.
IV. UndueHardship:Analvsisof SixthCircuit Precedent
A. Procedural Matters
Section523(a)(8)is self-executing.38Thus,pursuantto BankruptcyRules4007and
7001(6)anactionto determinedischargeabilityof a debtmustbebroughtasanadversary
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proceeding39inwhichthedebtorhastheburdenof provingthatrepaymentof theeducational
loanswouldimposean "unduehardship"undersection523(a)(8).40Whenmanyof the
relevantfacts,particularlythosepertainingto thedebtor'semploymentand income,are
stipulatedby theparties,anadversaryproceedingis unnecessary,andtheissueof undue
hardshipanddischargeabilitymaybedeterminedbywayofadispositivemotion.41
FederalRulesof Civil Procedure,Rule52,is applicabletoadversaryproceedingsby
virtueof FederalRuleof BankruptcyProcedure7052.42Rule52(a)requiresa bankruptcy
courthearinganadversaryproceedingtomakefindingsof factandconclusionsof law. It is
notnecessaryfor thejudgeto prepare laboratefindingson everypossibleissueraisedat
trial;however,"theremustbefindings,in suchdetailandexactnessasthenatureof thecase
permits,of subsidiaryfactsonwhichanultimateconclusioncanrationallybepredicated.,,43
"Thefindingsshouldbeexplicitsoastogivetheappellatecourtaclearunderstandingof the
basisof thetrialcourt'sdecision,andtoenableittodeterminethegroundsonwhichthetrial
courtreacheditsdecision.,,44
Beforefindingunduehardshipanddischargingan educationalloan,a courtmust
considerthe factorsarticulatedby theSixthCircuitas relevantwhendeterminingundue
hardship,elseitsdecisionwill bereversedonappeal.45A determinationthataneducational
loanposesanunduehardshipundersection523(a)(8)is amixedquestionof lawandfact.46
A lowercourt'sconclusionsof law aresubjecto de novo review,i.e.,a reviewingcourt
decidestheissueasif it hadnotbeenheardbeforewithnodeferencebeinggiventothetrial
court'sconclusionsof law.47A lowercourt'sfindingsof factarereviewedundertheclearly
erroneousstandard,i.e.,areviewingcourtdetermineswhetherit is "leftwiththedefiniteand
firmconvictionthatamistakehasbeencommitted."48
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B. The "UndueHardshig"Standard
A courtmaynotdischargeaneducationalloanunlessa debtorsatisfiestheundue
hardshipstandardsetforthin section523(a)(8)to dischargeaneducationalloan.49What
constitutesunduehardshipforpurposesofsection523(a)(8)hasbeenoneof themostwidely
litigatedissues. The unduehardshipexceptionhas proveddifficult to applybecause
Congressdid not see fit to definethe term in its variousenactments,leavingthe
determinationtobemadebythebankruptcycourtsona case-by-casebasisafterconsidering
a debtor'scircumstances.In aneffortto construethisprovision,bankruptcycourtsdrew
uponthelegislativehistoryof section523(a)(8)50and"compensatedfor lackof a definition
bydevisingteststomeasureunduehardship.,,51Threesuchtestsquicklyshapedthenascent
judicial landscape:PennsylvaniaHigherEducationAssistanceAuthorityv Johnson(In re
Johnson},52Bryantv PennsylvaniaHigherEducationAssistanceAgency(In re Bryant),53
andBrunnerv NewYork StateHigherEducationServicesCorporation.54
For manyyears,theSixthCircuitdeclinedto adoptanyonetest,butit frequently
lookedfor guidancefromthetestenunciatedby theSecondCircuitCourtof Appealsin
Brunnerv New York StateHigherEducationServicesCorporation,55commonlyknownas
the"Brunnertest."On February3,2005,however,theCourtexpresslyadoptedtheBrunner
testasthetestto beappliedintheSixthCircuitwhendeterminingwhethereducationalloan
debtpresentsanunduehardshiponadebtor.56Thistestrequiresacourttodeterminethat:I)
basedon currentincomeandexpenses,thedebtorcannotmaintaina minimalstandardof
livingforhimselfandhisdependentsif forcedtorepaytheloans,2)additionalcircumstances
existindicatingthatthisstateof affairsis likelyto persistfor a significantportionof the
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repaymentperiodof thestudentloans,and3)thedebtorhasmadegoodfaitheffortstorepay
theloans.57
c. Inabilitv toMaintainMinimalStandardof Livin1!
The firstprongof theBrunnertestrequiresa courtto determinewhether,basedon
currentincomeandexpenses,a debtorcannotmaintaina minimalstandardof livingfor
himselfandhisdependentsif forcedto repaytheloans.58 "Wherea familyearnsa modest
incomeandthefamilybudget,whichshowsnounnecessaryor frivolousexpenditures,i still
unbalanced,a hardshipexistsfromwhicha debtormaybedischargedof his studentloan
obligations.,,59Under this prong,a "bankruptcycourtmustascertainwhat amountis
minimallynecessaryto ensurethatthedependents'needsfor care,includingfood,shelter,
clothing,andmedicaltreatmentaremet.,,60Whenassessingadebtor'sfinancesforpurposes
of dischargingeducationalloans,theSixthCircuitononehandprofessesto "stopshortof
h I ,,61utter opeessness. On the other hand,however,the Court maintainsthat "the
dischargeabilityof studentloansshouldbebaseduponthecertaintyof hopelessness,not
simplyapresentinabilityto fulfill financialcommitment.,,62In eithercase,a debtorshould
notbemade"aslavetotheloans"orotherwisebedeprived"of anyfuturehopeforfinancial
independence.,,63
Whenmakingdeterminationsregardingthisfactor,theSixthCircuithasconsidered
thedebtor'smonthlyexpenses,bothstandingaloneandincontrastwiththedebtor'smonthly
income,andthedebtor'sannualincomeinrelationtothePovertyGuidelines.To besure,in
Cheesmanv TennStudentAssistanceCorp(In reCheesman),64oneof theSixthCircuit's
mostseminaldecisionsontheissueof unduehardship,thehusbandandwifedebtorsought
a dischargeof approximately$30,000in outstandingdebts,of which $14,267was
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attributableto guaranteedstudentloans. Thedebtors'grossincomewas$15,676,leaving
thema net incomeof $13,720.They providedthecourtwith an expensechartlisting
monthlyexpensesthattotaled$1,594. Includedin thischartwasa $100monthlytuition
expenseto sendoneof theirtwochildrentoa privateschoolbecausethedebtorsfoundthe
threatof corporalpunishmentposedby publicschoolingunacceptable.The couple's
daughterhadasthmaandrequiredmedicaltreatmentwhichfurtheraccountedfor $140in
medicalfeeslistedontheexpensechart.Althoughthecouple'shealthinsurancewaspaidby
hisemployer,thefamilyneverthelessincurredvariousexpensesrelatedto theirdaughter's
asthmaconditionbecauseof theirhighdeductible.The debtorsowneda 1988Chevrolet
Nova, worthapproximately$3,000,on which theyowed$7,081and paid in monthly
paymentsof $350.65
Althoughthelowercourtdid notstatewhichtestit hadusedto determinethatthe
loans imposedan unduehardship,the Sixth Circuit concludedthat "the loanswere
dischargeableunderany unduehardshiptestthe courtmay haveusedin reachingits
decision.,,66Thatpanelreasonedthat
therewas no indicationthatthedebtorswerecapableof payingthe loans
while maintaininga minimalstandardof living. The debtors'1992gross
incomeof $15,676exceededby onlya slimmarginthegovernment's1992
povertyincomeguidelineof $13,950fora familyof four.Theexpensechart
presentedby the Cheesmansdemonstratedthat they maintaineda frugal
lifestyleconsistentwiththeirlow income.Despitethisfact,theCheesmans
hada monthlydeficitof approximately$400.Underthesecircumstances,we
aresatisfiedthattheCheesmanscouldnotmaintaina minimalstandardof
livingfortheirfamilyif theywererequiredtorepaytheirloans.67
As indicatedin itsholding,theCheesmanCourtconsideredthePovertyGuidelinesin
conjunctionwithacomparativeanalysisof thedebtor'sincomeandexpenses.
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In TennStudentAssistanceCorQv Hornsby(In re Hornsby)68thehusbandandwife
debtors,who hadthreesmallchildren,soughto discharge ducationalloansthattotaled
$33,387.67at thetimeof thedischargeabilityproceeding.The couplehad$2,556.66in
disposablemonthlyincomeand$2,364.90in monthlyexpenses,leavingthemanoperating
monthlysurplusof $191.76to $280.43,dependingonwhetherthehusbandearnedovertime
for a particularmonth.69The loanguarantorarguedthatthedebtorshadnot"tighten(ed]
theirbelts"inasmuchas 1) thecouplehadrecentlypurchaseda newerusedautomobile,
whichhadresultedin an increasein theirautomobilerepairexpenses;2) thecouplehad
movedfromTennesseetoTexas,therebyincreasingtheirmonthlyrentalexpenseby$200;3)
thecouplehad"relativelyhighbills for telephoneuse,electricity,mealseatenout,and
cigarettes";and4) thecouple'sincomewell exceededthestandardfor a familyof five
establishedin thePovertyGuidelines,sincetheirprojectedincomewouldexceed$36,000
whilethePovertyGuidelinesforafamilyof fivewasonly$17,710.70Thelowercourtfound
thatI) althoughthecarexpendituremighthavebeenill-advised,thecouplehadpurchased
thecarwitha good-faithbeliefthatit woulddecreasetheirexpenses,and2) thecouple's
moveto Texashadbeennecessitatedby a needfor greaterjob securityfor theparties.
Accordingly,thebankruptcycourtconcludedthatthedebtorswerenotcapableof paying
theirstudentloansandmaintainingaminimalstandardof livingandgrantedthemahardship
discharge.Thecourtdidnotaddresstheissueregardingthecouple'sbillsfor telephoneuse,
electricity,mealseatenout,andcigarettes.71
The SixthCircuitCourtof Appealsreversed,findingthatalthoughthelowercourt
had "purportedto applythe Brunnertestof unduehardship,it did not engagein the
meaningfulinquiryrequiredtoevaluateithertheHornsbys'expensesortheextentowhich
12
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theirdiscretionaryincomecouldbeappliedtotheirstudentloans."n TheCourtconcluded
that"[t]hebankruptcycourt'sanalysis implywasnotthoroughenoughto supportafinding
of unduehardship.,,73TheCircuitfurtherexplained:
WhiletheHornsbyfamilyincomemaybemodest,theHornsbyfamilybudget
is not unbalanced.The Hornsbysoperatewith a surplusof approximately
$200permonth,andtheirincomeputsthemsignificantlyabovethepoverty
guidelinefor a familyof five. The Hornsbysfurtherdo not seemto have
minimizedexpensesin everywaypossible.The bankruptcycourtdid not
questionwhatseemlikeanexorbitantbill for longdistancetelephoneservice
ortheHornsbys'monthlybill of $100forcigarettes.74
Baseduponthesefacts,theappellatepanelconcludedthat"[t]heHornsbys'financial
circumstancesandmanagementof theirdebtsdonotmeetanytestof unduehardshipsuchto
justifydischargeoftheirstudentloanobligations.,,75
In DeMatteisv CaseW Reserv_eUniv (In re DeMatteis),76thedebtor'seducational
loandebttotaled$110,469.38andhermonthlyloanpaymentwasapproximately$630atthe
timeshefiledherbankruptcypetition.Thedebtorhadtakenajob asanofficemanagerina
chiropracticofficeforwhichhernetmonthlyincomewas$1,034.Thedebtordidnotsuffer
from any physical,emotionalor mentalconditionthat preventedher from obtaining
employment.Thedebtorwassingleandhadnochildren,livedathomewithherparents,and
droveherfather'scartowork. Afteranalyzingherbudget,thebankruptcycourtfoundthat
thedebtor'smonthlyincomeexceededherexpensesby at least$200andalsofoundthat
someof her expenses"appear[ed] higherthanwe customarilysee for a personin her
circumstances.. . indicat[ingthat]Plaintiffwouldbeableto devoteat leastsomeof her
incometowardrepaymentof theloanswithoutsufferingasubstantialdeclineinherstandard
of living." The bankruptcycourtfoundthis"a veryclosecase,"butnotwithstandingit's
rulingthatthedebtorwouldbe"unabletopayoffherloansentirely,evenif sheentersintoa
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thirty(30)yearrepaymentplan,"it determinedthatthedebtorhadnotestablishedundue
hardship.77Despitetheabsenceof anydemonstrableunduehardship,thecourtexercisedits
equitablepowersandfixedthedebtor'seducationalloandebtpaymentat$200permonthfor
tenyears,effectivelydischarging$86,469.38ofthedebtor's$110,469.38loandebt.78
In Dolphv PennHigherEd AssistAgency(In re Dolph),79thedebtorsuccessfully
establishedunduehardshipby showingthatat thetimeof theadversaryproceedinghis
monthlyhouseholdexpensesexceededhis monthlyhouseholdincomeby approximately
$500.Thedebtorfurtherestablishedthathehadnosubstantialssetstosellinordertorepay
theloan. Boththedebtorandhis wifetestifiedthattheonlyportionof theirbudgethat
couldpossiblybeadjustedwastheamountallocatedto food. On thefactsof thiscase,the
SixthCircuitdidnothesitateto findthatthedebtorhadsufficientlyestablishedthathewas
unabletorepaytheloanswhilemaintainingaminimalstandardofliving.80
In Rice v UnitedStates(In re Rice)81theSixthCircuit upheldthe lowercourt's
refusaltodischargethedebtor'seducationalloans,notingthatrepaymentwouldnotreduce
thedebtor'sstandardof livingto belowor nearthepovertylevelas determinedby the
PovertyGuidelines.TheCourtalsomadeparticularnoteof thefactthatthedebtor'schildren
were presumablyattendingprivateschoolsand that the family claimedexpensesfor
"Recreation/vacations."82 The Rice Courtalsotookspecialnoteof thefactthedebtors'
claimedexpenseshad,"withoutapparentreasonablejustification,undergonea 'disturbing'
increaseoverashortperiod.,,83
Takingthe Court'srulingson this criterionas a whole,a generalrule evolves
wherebytheSixthCircuitisapttofindunduehardshipwhena debtor'sgrossincomeisator
nearthePovertyGuidelinesand,despiteafrugallifestyle,hisexpensesexceedhisincome.
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D. LikelihoodthatStateofAffairsWill Persist
ThesecondprongoftheBrunnertestrequiresacourttodeterminewhetheradditional
circumstancesxistwhichindicatethatthepresentfinancialstateof affairsis likelytopersist
fora significantportionof therepaymentperiodof thestudentloans.84Suchcircumstances
mustbe indicativeof a "certaintyof hopelessness,notmerelya presentinabilityto fulfill
financialcommitment.,,85"Theymayincludeillness,disability,a lackof useablejob skills,
or theexistenceof a largenumberof dependents.,,86"And,mostimportantly,theymustbe
beyondthedebtor'scontrol,notborneof freechoice.,,87"Choosinga low-payingjob cannot
meritunduehardshiprelief.,,88AlthoughtheCourthasacknowledgedthatdetermining
futurepersistenceof presentfactorsis "necessarilyspeculative,"thisfact"doesnotrelieve
thedebtorof theburdenof provingthathewill beobstructedfromearninga livingin the
future.,,89
The Court hastypicallyemployedtwo factorswhendeterminingthis issue:the
debtor'sphysicalandmentalfacultiesandthelikelihoodof thedebtor'sprospectivegainful
employment.TheCourthasnotattachedmuchreasoningto itsconsiderationof a debtor's
physicalandmentalfaculties.Forexample,inTennStudentAssistanceCorpv Hornsby(In
re Hornsby),90thebankruptcycourthadfoundthatthedebtors'earningcapacitywaslikely
to remainrelativelyconstantfor manyyears,despitethefactthatcurrentday-carexpenses
mightdissipateovertime,becauseanyadditionalmoneysavedfromtheday-carexpenses
wouldbe insignificant.Ratherthanfocuson theamountof incomeby whichthedebtors
wouldbe increasedoncerelievedof theday-careexpenses,the Sixth Circuit reversed,
summarilyconcludingthatthedebtors"are'youngaswell ashealthy,andin all likelihood
[their]incomewill increaseinthefuture.',,91Otherpanelsof theCourthavesimilarlyruled
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thatdebtorswhoare"intelligentandwell-spoken,albeitunderemployed"failtoestablishthat
theirstateof affairswouldlikelypersistfora significantportionof therepaymentperiod.92
Presumably,theCourtassumesthatadebtorwhois healthy,intelligent,andarticulatewill be
ableto remedyhis financialplightin anamountof timewhich is lessthana significant
portionoftherepaymentperiodofthestudentloans.
AlthoughtheCourthasbeenrelativelymorearticulatewhendecidingthelikelihood
of a debtor'sprospectivegainfulemployment,hiscriterionhasalsoprovendifficultto
implement.For instance,in Cheesmanv TennStudentAssistanceCorp.(In reCheesman),93
thehusbandebtortestifiedthathehopedtoreceivea promotionwithinthenearfuture,and
thewifedebtorwasreceivingunemploymentbenefits,activelyseekingemployment,andhad
beenplacedon the Board of Education'spreferredhiring list. Upon affirmingthe
bankruptcycourt'sfindingof unduehardship,theSixthCircuitreasoned:
Second,therewasno indicationthatthedebtors'financialsituationwould
improvein theforeseeablefuture.True,Dallastestifiedthathewashoping
forapromotionathiscurrentjob,andMargarettestifiedthatshewasactively
seekingemployment.Thereis noassurance,however,thateitherwill obtain
theirobjectives.Moreover,Margaret'semploymenthistorydoesnotindicate
thattheCheesmans'financialconditionwouldimproveconsiderablyif she
obtaineda position as a teacher'saide. At best, she worked only
intermittentlyasa teacher'saide. Shereceivedonly minimalwagesbefore
herpositionwaseliminated.Also,thecourtproperlyconsideredthefactthat
Margaret'sunemploymentcompensationwouldrunoutwithintwoweeksof
the hearingand thatthis wouldburdenfurtherthe Cheesmans'financial
situation.94
Judge Guy dissented,findingthat the debtorshad not establishedthatcurrent
circumstanceswouldpreventheirfinancialconditionfromimprovingin thefutureor that
theyhadactedingood faith:
TheCheesmansarenotdisabled.Theyarenotill. Theyarenotelderly.They
are both collegetrained. At the time of the bankruptcyhearing,Mr.
Cheesmanhelda job, and he testifiedthattherewas thepossibilityof a
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promotionwithhiscurrentemployer.Mrs.Cheesmanis qualifiedtotutoror
substituteteach,asshedidpriortothefilingof theChapter7petition.These
circumstancesare inappositeof thosein casesin whicha courthasfound
"additionalcircumstances"toexist.95
RelyinguponCheesman,theCourthassubsequentlyclarifiedthatan"effectivejob
search"neednotequateto a "successfuljob search.,,96[n Dolphv PennHigherEd Assist
Agency(In reDolph),97thebankruptcycourtheardconsiderablevidenceabouthedebtor's
effortsto obtainemployment.Thedebtortestifiedthathehadsentoutapproximately200
resumesbeforeobtaininghiscurrentemploymentwitha carrentalagency.Thecourtalso
heardtestimonyfromtheloanguarantor'sexpertwitnessthatthedebtorhadnotconducted
aneffectivejob search.TheDolphCourtexplained:
It shouldbe notedthat,throughoutthe trial proceedingsand duringthis
appeal,both partiesfrequentlyusedthe phrase"effectivejob search,"
apparentlyto mean"successfuljob search,"i.e.,ajob searchthatresultedin
employmentor higherpayingemployment.Cheesmandoesnotrequirethe
Debtortoconductsuchajob search.InCheesman,thedebtors'job searchdid
not resultin higherpayingemployment;nevertheless,thecourtof appeals
sustainedthe bankruptcycourt'sdischargeof their studentloans. The
debtor'sjob searchandtheresultsof sucha search,howevercharacterized,
aresimplyfactors,amongallotherrelevantfactors,thatthebankruptcycourt
wouldconsiderinapplyingthesecondpartof theCheesmantest.98
In Oyler v EducationalCreditManagementCorp (In re Oyler),99thelowercourt
grantedthedebtor,a48-year-oldmarriedpastorwiththreechildrenandleaderof aMessianic
Jewishcongregation,a hardshipdischargeof approximately$40,000in educationalloans.
Beforefoundinghischurch,thedebtorhadearnedbachelorsandmaster'sdegrees,workedas
a salesmanandaudioengineer,andonceownedhisownbusiness.At thetimeof trial,the
debtor'sfamilyincomehadbeenlessthan$10,000for eachof theprecedingtwoyears--
well belowthePovertyGuidelinesfora familyof five. Thechurchcongregationprovided
thefamilywithanapartmentanda salaryaround$1,200permonth,whichvarieddepending
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onthecongregationmembers'contributions.Thefamilyhadnohealthinsurance,andthe
debtorsufferedfourretinaldetachmentsa a resultof a medicalcondition.Theonlydebts
whichthedebtorsoughtodischargewerehiseducationalloandebts.
To establishthatcircumstancesexistedwhich indicatedthatthedebtor'spresent
financialstateof affairswerelikelyto persistfor a significantportionof therepayment
periodof thestudentloans,thedebtortestifiedthathewascompletelycommittedto his
callingasa ministerin hisMessianicJewishcongregationandthathiscircumstanceswould
belikelyto continuefor theforeseeablefuture.Additionally,twopastorstestifiedthatthe
debtorwascommittedtohiscallingandthathiscircumstanceswereunlikelytochange.The
lowercourtgrantedthedebtorahardshipdischargeof $38,978.20ineducationalloans.The
guarantorappealedonthegroundsthatthedebtor'scircumstanceswerenotlikelytopersist
for theforeseeablefuturebecausethebankruptcycourtrefusedto considerthatthedebtor
couldhavesimplyobtaineda higherpayingjob eitherwitha differentcongregationor in
anotherfield. The SixthCircuitagreed,andheldthatthedebtorhadfailedto satisfythe
secondprongof theBrunnertestbecausehehad"shownno 'additionalcircumstances.. .
indicatingthatthisstateof affairsis likelytopersistforasignificantportionof therepayment
period.'"100
Oyler'schoicetoworkasapastorofasmallstart-upchurchcannotexcusehis
failure to supplementhis incomeso that he can meetknowinglyand
voluntarilyincurredfinancialobligations.By educationandexperiencehe
qualifiesforhigher-payingworkandis obligedtoseekworkthatwouldallow
debtrepaymentbeforehecanclaimunduehardship.SeeIn reStorey,312BR
at872(debtormustdoeverythinginhispowerto improvefinancialsituation);
In re Kraft, 161BR at86-87(debtorneededto lookforall job opportunities
beforeclaimingunduehardship). The BankruptcyCourt erredby not
consideringthat Oyler's decisionnot to maximizehis earnings,though
commendable,wasvoluntarilymadeafterhe alsovoluntarilyincurredthe
debtthathenowwishestodischarge.101
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Thus,accordingto Oylera debtormaynotvoluntarilydecreasehis likelihoodof
obtainingprospectivegainfulemploymentthenseekadischargeasanunduehardshipbased
uponhisvoluntarydecision.
It is imperativethatabankruptcycourt'sfactualfindingsbeclearregardingadebtor's
likelihoodof prospectivegainfulemployment.In Dolphv PennHigherEd AssistAgency
(In re Dolph),102the lowercourt foundthat"[a] lack of skill at obtainingoptimum
employmentdoesnotrequirethat[Dolph]bepenalizedwithafindingof nondischargeability
whereotherfactorssuggestthecontraryresult.All inall, it appears[Dolph]hasmadehonest,
albeitinept,effortsto find betteremployment."103The SixthCircuitnotedthatwhilethe
debtor'seffortsassociatedwithhisjob searchcouldbea componentof thedebtor'sgood
faitheffortsto repaytheloans,theproprietyof a debtor'sjob searchis morerelevanto
determiningwhetheradditionalcircumstancesxistwhichindicatethatthedebtor'sfinancial
situationis likelytopersist.Becausetheappellatecourtin Dolphwasuncleartowhatextent
andunderwhatbranchof theBrunnertestthebankruptcycourthadconsideredthedebtor's
job searchefforts,it vacatedthe lowercourt'srulingandremandedthecasefor further
factualfindings.104 Similarly,thelowercourtin Dolphfoundthatthedebtorwouldnotbe
ableto makeany paymentson the loan in the reasonablyforeseeablefuturewithout
substantialhardshipto hisfamilyandthatthedebtordidnothave,norwouldhehavein the
reasonablyforeseeablefuture,sufficientsaleableassetsordisposableincomewhichcouldbe
appliedtowardrepaymentof theloans,absentsacrificetotheimmediateneedsof hisfamily.
Thus,thebankruptcycourtconcludedthat"[t]hequestionof what[Dolph's]futureholdsin
storeforhim--beita newandbetterjob orbeitapromotionwithhispresentemployer-- is
unknown,andanyimmediatevaluationof thelikelihoodfor positivechangein [Dolph's]
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presentor futurefinancialcircumstancesis speculativeandnota firmbasisfor theCourtto
reacha decision."105TheSixthCircuitfoundthebankruptcycourt'sfindingsambiguous
andinadequateosupportheconclusionthatthedebtorhadsatisfiedhisburdentoestablish,
byapreponderanceof theevidence,thatadditionalcircumstancesxistwhichwouldmakeit
likelythathiscurrentinabilitytorepaytheeducationalloanswouldpersist.Accordingly,the
appellatecourtremandedforclarificationofthebankruptcycourt'sfindings.106
E. BonaFideEfforts toR~lli!YLoans
The lastprongof theBrunnertestrequiresthatthedebtormakegoodfaitheffortsto
repaytheloans.to?TheSixthCircuit'sdecisionsonthispointareclear:Hardshipdischarges
will be deniedabsenta showingof at leasta minimalgood faith effort to repaythe
educationalloans.In makingthisdetermination,theCourthaslookednotonlytothenumber
andamountof loanpaymentsbutalsotothetimingof theloanpaymentsin relationtothe
timingof thebankruptcypetitionseekingdischargeof theeducationalloans.
For example,in TennStudentAssistanceCorpv Hornsby(In re Hornsby),108the
bankruptcycourthadfoundin a conclusoryfashionthatthehusbandandwifedebtorshad
exhibitedgoodfaitheffortsin managingtheirstudentloans,despitethefactthattheyhad
failedto makeevena singlepayment.TheSixthCircuitreversed,findingthelowercourt's
rulingunsupportedby theevidence.109
Thereafter,in Miller v PennHigherEd AssistAgency(In re Miller),llotheSixth
Circuitheldthatthedebtorhadfailedtoshowthatshehadmadegoodfaitheffortstorepay
theloans"becausein thefiveyearssinceshehadleftschool,shehadcontributedonly$368
towardsrepaymentof herstudentloans,whichtotaledalmost$90,000,while usingsuch
'non-essentials'as personalinternetservice,longdistancetelephoneservice,cell phone
20
-- --
service,andcabletelevision."III Thus,theMiller courtconsideredtheamountof theloan
repaymentaswellastheamountof thepaymentincontrastothedebtor'sexpendituresfor
otheritems.
In Ricev UnitedState(In reRice)112theCourtrefusedtograntahardshipdischarge,
notingthattheoutstandingeducationalloandebtwaslargelythedebtor'sowndoingbecause
of hisminimalrepayments--somemadeinvoluntarilythroughgarnishmentproceedings-
andthatthesepaymentsreflectedlittleefforton his partto satisfytheoriginalobligation.
This factorweighedparticularlyheavyagainstdischargein lightof thecompleteabsenceof
anyevidencethatdire financialcircumstancespreventedthedebtorfrommakinga larger
.
h d b 113Impact on tee t.
Not onlyhavecourtsconsideredebtors'effortsat repaymentof theireducational
loans,theyhavealsoconsideredthetimingof loanpaymentsin relationtothetimingof the
petitionseekingbankruptcyrelief. Thus,in Cheesmanv TennStudentAssistanceCorp(In
re Cheesman},114the Sixth Circuit affirmedthe bankruptcycourt's finding of undue
hardship,noting:
Third, therewasno evidencethattheCheesmansdid notact in goodfaith.
This isnotacasewherethepetitionerseeksdischargewithinamonthof loans
becomingdue. The Cheesmansmademinimalpaymentson their loans
severalyearsaftertheirloansbecamedueandat leasta yearbeforefilingfor
bankruptcy.Furthermore,theCheesmanschosetoworkin worthwhile,albeit
low-paying,professions.Thereis no indicationthattheywereattemptingto
abusethe studentloan systemby having their loans forgivenbefore
embarkingon lucrativecareersin the privatesector.In light of these
considerations,weholdthattheCheesmans'tudentloansimposedanundue
hardship. I15
Again,JudgeGuydissented,findingthatthedebtorshadnotestablishedthattheyhad
actedin goodfaithsince,duringthesix-yearperiodaftertheloansfirstbecamedueand
owing,thedebtorshadmadeonlytwo$50paymentsoneachof theirloans.Therealsowas
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noevidencethatthedebtorsoughthelessdrasticremedyof a defermentof paymentson
theirdebtsbeforeattemptingtodischargethem.116
A bankruptcycourt'sfailureto makesufficientfindingsregardinga debtor'sgood
faithefforts,or lackthereof,to repaytheeducationalloansis fatallydefective.In Dolphv
PennHigherEd AssistAgency(Inre Dolph),117althoughthedebtorhadmade21payments
owedonhiseducationalloansandhadnotsoughtadischargeshortlyafterhis loansbecame
due,theSixthCircuitremanded"for therequiredfindings"becausethelowercourtrecord
was"silentconcerningtheissueofgoodfaith."118
TheSixthCircuithasalsonotedthatanunbalancedratioof educationalloandebtto
theotherdebtssetforthinthebankruptcypetitionmaybesuggestiveof a badfaithintento
merelydischargeeducationaloandebt.I19
VI. Conclusion
Overthecourseof thelastthirtyyears,Congresshasfoundthenotionof a "fresh
start" for debtorsseekingto dischargeeducationaloans in bankruptcyproceedings
outweighedby a purportedeffort to maintainthe integrityof federally-guaranteed
educationalloanprograms.In thecompleteabsenceof anydefiningcriteria,courtshave
struggledwiththetaskof determiningwhenthefailuretodischargeducationalloanswould
imposeanunduehardshiponthedebtorandhisdependents.Thelackof uniformityamongst
SixthCircuit decisionsis perhaps ymptomaticof theCourt's internalstrugglebetween
wantingto advancethe valuesof a post-secondaryeducationwhile not subjecting
government-sponsoredloanguaranteeprogramsto undueabusebythelessscrupulous.The
SixthCircuitmayhaveputit bestwhenit declared:"It is clearthatCongressintendedto
makedischargeof a studentloanmoredifficultto dischargethanothertypesof debt,
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although not impossible.,,120This attempto makehardshipdischargesdifficult, yet
possible,hassucceededinasmuchas"nondischargeabilityhasbecomethebroadrulewith
onlya narrowlyconstruedunduehardshipdischarge.,,121Thus,Congresshasapparently
triumphedin itsefforttoexaltthefiscalintegrityof governmentprogramsoverthenotionof
a"freshstart"fordebtorsburdenedwitheducationalloandebt.
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